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Rivals in Arms: Sino-U.S. Cooperation,
Problems, and Solutions and Their Impact on
the International UAV Industry
BEI-ER CHEOK*
ABSTRACT
Research and development into drone technology has exploded in the
United States in the recent decades. From the operation of killer drones
in the military to agricultural survey drones in farms, the proliferation of
drone technology is well on its way to radically altering the American
future. However, there remains numerous laws, policies, and regulations
that place stifling restrictions on drone development and operations in
America. Halfway across the world, China has also begun to experience
the "drone revolution," but with its relatively laxer laws regarding both
commercial and public drone operations and manufacturing, it seems
poised to surpass the United States in not only drone R&D, but drone
export as well. In recent years, China has expanded to become "a prolific
developer and no-questions-asked exporter of UAVs" selling to a plethora
of nations ranging from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan and Nigeria.'
Domestically, China has relied firmly on indigenous production and
R&D since the 1980s to expand its UAV technologies, expanding its UAV
industry to include a variety of defense firms as well as academic
research groups.2 However, China's drone program is not without its own
issues and setbacks, forcing the Civil Aviation Administration of China
(CAAC) to issue new drone regulations to be implemented on a trial
* Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D. 2018. My sincerest gratitude to the
Editorial Board and Associates of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies for all their
hard work in editing and providing constructive feedback on this Note. I would like to give
special thanks to Zachary L. Votaw, Mason A. Moody, and Randall T. Tesser for their
invaluable suggestions and advice, as well as constant support, throughout the writing
process. Finally I would like to thank my parents for their constant and unconditional
support throughout the entire endeavor.
1. Adam Rawnsley, Meet China's Killer Drones, FOREIGN POLICY (January 14, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/14/meet-chinas-killer-drones/.
2. Kimberly Hsu, China's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC
AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION (June 2013).
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basis. This paper will analyze and compare the two comprehensive UAV
regulations-the stricter FAA regulations and the newer UAV
regulations promulgated by the CAAC and explore the differences
between the two regulatory policies (both commercial and military), their
benefits and drawbacks, and attempt to present solutions as to how the
CAAC and the FAA can help build an initial framework for other
nations to follow.
INTRODUCTION
Since its post-Mao entry into the international market, China has vaulted into
the heights of economic giants. Currently, one of its largest sectors undergoing
massive levels of research and development (R&D), production, export controls,
and operations regulation is its drone3 industry. Although certain studies have
predicted that China's technology sector will not be a prime competitor against the
United States for decades,' the combined power of foreign funding and China's
private civilian industry, academia, and military' in advancing the UAV industry
threatens to disprove this notion. The resourcefulness of these various sectors
allows China to easily offer cheaper alternatives to American-made UAVs.
Consequently, China now stands as the largest sole competitor to the United States
in a majority of sectors in the UAV industry, ranging from export and production to
R&D to drone operations policies.6 Despite various concerns that China's rise
threatens the American drone industry and vocal criticism of its relatively
unregulated drone exports, China's recent actions have revealed its willingness to
cooperate in the field of international exports regulation. Several newly adopted
policies and export regulations have shown a China that may have realized its place
in the UAV industry as an essential ally helping the United States affect positive
change in the realm of UAV operations regulations and international export
controls.
This paper seeks to undertake a comparative study of China's and the United
States' drone sectors, specifically detailing their distinct histories of UAV
3. The author will use "drone" and "UAV" (unmanned aerial vehicle) interchangeably
for the purposes of this paper.
4. See MICAH SPRINGUT ET AL., CHINAS PROGRAM FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
MODERNIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 8 (2011) ("China has yet
to show that it can meaningfully use the tools of the state to drive the commercialization
of discoveries in research labs in a competitive manner.").
5. See Daniel Houpt, Civilian UAV Production as a Window to the PLA's Unmanned
Fleet, 12 CHINA BRIEF, Feb. 21, 2012, at 6, https://jamestown.org/program/civilian-uav-
production-as-a-window-to-the-plas-unmanned-fleet/.
6. See TATE Q. KRASNER, ASSESSING CHINAS UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (S.
Rajaratnam Sch. of Int'l Studies 2014); Becca Schwarz, China: The World's Drone
Superstore, FOREIGN AFF. REV. (Apr. 28, 2016), http://foreignaffairsreview.co.uk/2016/
04/drone-2/.
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development and production, their distinct operations regulations for commercial
UAV and the differences in their international export policies regarding military-
grade, weaponized UAVs. There is a clear distinction between the U.S. commercial
and military drone production, with heavy domestic regulation governing
commercial drone operations and strict self-regulation and international parameters
for exports of weaponized UAVs. Conversely, in China, the fluidity and
cooperation in its complex academia-civilian-military UAV industry, coupled with
less rigid regulations, has pushed drone research, production, and export (both
commercial and military) to the next level. The paper will then analyze the
consequences of such rapid Chinese advancements in the domestic and
international UAV industry and the role the United States plays in this expansion.
Finally, I will offer some conclusions and potential solutions as to how the United
States and China, as emerging leaders in the international UAV industry, can and
should spearhead Sino-U.S. cooperation to better international export controls on
weaponized UAVs and draw from each other's commercial drone operations
regulations to increase the efficiency of their respective operations policies. This
will ensure that other nations interested in developing their own commercial and
military UAV regulations through their civil aviation authority will have a well-
functioning operational blueprint to lay an initial framework, as exemplified by
those of the EU, Japan, and the ACP Countries (Asia, Caribbean, and Pacific
Group of States).
I. A TALE OF Two GIANTS
A. The American Story
The United States' interest in UAVs first originated in the military, beginning
during World War I and continuing into the era of modem military technology.
UAV technology remained quite antiquated through the Vietnam War, as it was
primarily based on manned aircraft and used only for military reconnaissance and
surveillance. In the 1970s, the U.S. military began contracting private corporations
to produce more advanced UAVs.7 This trend would continue through today; at the
end of the First Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DoD) contracted General
Atomics to build the Predator, one of the most recognized of today's weaponized
UAVs. After decades of testing, the U.S. government finally recognized UAVs as a
fully-fledged program worthy of full-time funding in the 1990s. Since then, the
U.S. production of military UAVs has only gone on the upward swing.
7. JOHN DAVID BLOM, UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 68-
70 (2010). A 1970 Air Force and National Security Agency joint venture to develop a UAV
with electronic signals intelligence capability eventually awarded contracts to Boeing and
Ryan Aeronautical Company. In 1975, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, a part of
Lockheed Martin, was contracted to help the Army develop the Aquila, a UAV capable of
providing laser designation for precision munitions.
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The government's drone purchases saw a dramatic spike over the last few
years, with defense spending on UAVs at nearly $14 billion over the last five years,
peaking in fiscal 2012.8 Although the proposed Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
budget for the 2017 fiscal year, at approximately $4.457 billion, is slated to be
lower than that of 2016, it has remained around the $4 to $5 billion range for the
last few years, and looks to only continue to do so thanks to a combination of
public and private investment into the UAV industry. The close-knit relationship
between private corporations and the military in production of military UAVs,
however, has led to a pigeonholing of innovation and development in the U.S.
military UAV sector. Because of various export regulations and the secretive nature
of the U.S. military, contracts for military-grade, weaponized UAVs are generally
limited to a handful of corporations, typically General Atomics (Predators and
Reapers), Lockheed Martin, or Boeing. This has continued a trend that has plagued
U.S. UAV development since the 1970s-deep-pocketed contractors demanding
unreasonably high costs coupled with timely development and production delays.
The Aquila system started development under Lockheed in 1975, and initial costs
had doubled to $1.6 billion in 1982. By 1987, this problem continued, with only
seven of the 105 test missions fulfilling requirements. The Army ultimately
scrapped the Aquila program despite pouring millions into the budget. Although it
would not pursue such similar mistakes later down the line, the government still
continued its reliance on a small number of these corporations in development of
military UAVs. This continued the trend of time delays and development and
production overages, 9 ultimately resulting in sometimes malfunctioning, high-cost
UAVs that cannot hold up to their international competition. Despite these issues,
the U.S. military UAV industry continues its steady growth, with many of these
8. MARKET VIEW: UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS IN DEFENSE 5 (2016),
http://www.govini.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Govini-Unmanned-AerialSystems
Defense.pdf.
9. The USAF the MQ1/9 Predator and Reaper acquisition program in 2002,
contracting General Atomics to build the armed UAV systems. In 2006, the Air Force
estimated the program would cost $3.75 billion, which has jumped to $10.75 billion by
2012. In 2015, Col. William S. Lester, program manager of the acquisition program, spoke
about the program, stating that "there are bound to be insidious artifacts lurking in the
system that we missed; some may be significant." This proved to be true, with the latest
generation of the Reaper being incapable of hot wef operations and plagued with mid-
flight loss of electrical power. Dan Gettinger, Drone Spending: The MQ-9 Reaper, CTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE AT BARD C. (Oct. 12, 2015), http://drone
center.bard.edu/drone-spending-the-mq-9-reaper/. See generally DEP'T OF DEF.,
PERFORMANCE OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 2015 ANNUAL REPORT (2015), https:
//admin.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs-edit/performance-of-defense-acquisition-system-
2015.pdf; Craig Whitlock, More Air Force Drones are Crashing Than Ever As Mysterious
New Problems Emerge, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/19/more-u-s-military-drones-are-crashing-than-
ever-as-new-problems-emerge/?utm_term=.b87 155cOe 113.
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private corporations involved in the military UAV industry branching out into
separate civilian commercial UAV production as well.
Although UAVs have been produced by the U.S. military since the 1950s, their
rapid expansion into the civilian, private market has been a modern phenomenon of
the last two decades. The FAA grossly underestimated the sudden growth of the
drone industry when, in 2010, it estimated that by 2020 there would perhaps be
over 15,000 civilian drones in the country. 10 In its most recent aviation forecast, the
FAA estimates that combined total hobbyist and commercial UAV sales will rise
from 2.5 million in 2016 to 7 million in 2020.11 A majority of these civilian and
commercial drones are produced by companies that initially were involved with the
development and production of weaponized military drones. General Atomics,
Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin are among a few large corporations that
have cornered the U.S. commercial drone production market.
The rise in drone production in the United States has also been in large part
thanks to the political-industrial complex started by the Congressional Unmanned
Systems Caucus. Formed by a small group of congressional representatives from
districts with drone industries, the Caucus soon gained traction and reached up to
sixty members by late 2012.12 Their goal was to "educate members of Congress
and the public on the strategic, tactical, and scientific value of unmanned systems;
actively support further development and acquisition of more systems, and to more
effectively engage the civilian aviation community on unmanned system use and
safety."13 The Caucus managed to bring about drone proliferation by channeling
earmarks to different UAV-producing corporations such as General Atomics,
pushed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a major drone
program, and increased the annual DoD and DHS budgets for drone R&D and
procurements. On top of political maneuvering, the Caucus partnered with the
Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), an industry
group that brings together the leading drone manufacturers and universities with
UAV research projects." AUVSI has an annual operating budget of $7.5 million,
with $2 million a year set aside for conferences and trade shows encouraging
10. Welcome to the Drone Age, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.
economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21666118-miniature-pilotless-aircraft-are-
verge-becoming-commonplace-welcome.
11. The Future of Commercial Drone Use, INS. J. (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.insu
rancejournal.com/news/national/2016/03/29/403149.htm.
12. Yasmin Tadjeh, New Senate Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Caucus to Tackle Privacy
Issues, NATIONAL DEFENSE (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
/articles/2012/11/30/20 12december-new-senate-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-caucus-to-tackle-
privacy-issues ("The House Unmanned Systems Caucus, formed in 2009, includes 60
members, and is led by Reps. Buck McKeon, R-Calif., and Henry Cuellar, D-Texas. . . .").
13. TOM BARRY, DRONES OVER THE HOMELAND: How POLITICS, MONEY AND LACK OF
OVERSIGHT HAVE SPARKED DRONE PROLIFERATION, AND WHAT WE CAN DO, 1, 7 (2013),
https://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/IPRDrones-overHomelandFinal
.pdf.
14. Id. at 8.
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various government agencies and companies to use unmanned systems. In response
to the U.S. UAV industry's quick pace of expansion, the government has adapted
several domestic operational regulations and international export agreements, albeit
at a potential economic cost.
B. Attempt at Self-Regulation
Following upsurge of commercial UAV numbers, the FAA was hard-pressed
to come up with policies and regulations that would ensure public safety while
advancing the use of drones into everyday life. 15 In its attempt to cover such a
broad spectrum of UAVs, the FAA passed Part 107, which lays out comprehensive
rules for drone operations, drone pilot qualifications and certifications, and aircraft
requirements. This policy only applies to nonhobbyist, commercial drones
weighing under fifty-five pounds and not to any individual or hobbyist merely
attempting to fly a model airplane.16 The FAA's new UAV regulations have led to
an increase in those registering their drones1 7 and in those registering for
exemptions.
Additionally, the introduction of Part 107 has changed certain aspects of
civilian commercial drone usage in the United States. Previously, the FAA had
required any for-profit, commercial drone operation to be piloted by an individual
carrying a pilot's license. This placed undue burdens on these operations, including
precious time and cost of pilot licensing. With the new Part 107 rules, the required
pilot's license has been replaced with a mandatory drone flight certification and
knowledge test. This allows companies and commercial drone operators a much
cheaper, faster, and direct method to reap the benefits of the drone revolution. The
loosening of pilot certification under Part 107 and introduction of waiversl9 have
15. Larry Downes, What's Wrong with the FAA's New Drone Rules, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Mar. 2, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/03/whats-wrong-with-the-faas-new-drone-rules ("In
fact, the FAA had originally promised the rules by 2011, but it proceeded to miss every
deadline it set for itself, as well as those established by Congress.").
16. 14 C.F.R. § 107.1 (2016).
17. As of February 2016, U.S. drone registration numbers hit 325,000 registered users,
more than the 320,000 piloted aircraft registered with the FAA. Keith Laing, Feds: 325K
Drones Now Registered, THE HILL (Feb. 8, 2016, 3:08 PM), http://thehill.com/policy
/transportation/268644-feds-325k-drones-now-registered; Jonathan Vanian, More Drones
Are Now Registered With the Government Than Airplanes, FORTUNE (Feb. 8, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/02/08/more-registered-drones-than-airplanes/.
18. See The Future of Commercial Drone Use, supra note 11, ("As of mid-March [2016],
the FAA has issued more than 4,000 . . . exemptions to insurers and organizations for
commercial drones to operate in the national airspace, which the agency said
demonstrates 'considerable potential demand for UAS operations, in low-risk, controlled
environments."').
19. The FAA has also introduced waivers to § 107, allowing certain emergency UAV
operations at nighttime such as search and rescue or firefighting. See generally John D.
Goetz et al., Key Issues and Insights for Transportation and Energy Companies Regarding
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also opened up various benefits of drone operations in fields such as surveying,
construction, infrastructure maintenance, and natural disaster responses. However,
one of the main economic sectors that can heavily benefit from drone operations,
but unfortunately is neglected by FAA's regulations, is commercial delivery.
Because of the strict regulations of maintaining constant visual line of sight
(VLOS), having flights only during the day, and observing severe weight
limitations (of under fifty-five pounds), U.S. policies on commercial UAVs have
alienated a potentially massive source of economic funding in the commercial
delivery industry.2 0 As commercial companies begin turning to nations with more
flexible regulations on UAV deliveries, the U.S. UAV industry faces another
economic setback with regard to exports of military UAVs, this time as a result of
both international agreements and a strict self-regulatory export policy.
Although the United States has been developing, using, and sometimes
exporting weaponized drones2 1 for quite some time, it has not been bound by many
regulations specifically targeted toward policing armed UAVs. The closest form of
international regulation that the United States has signed dealing with armed drones
is the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an agreement on
regulating nuclear-capable missiles and technology. The MTCR placed some
restrictions on certain drone exports,2 2 but, as a voluntary export control, was
ultimately insufficient to govern and regulate the rapid expansion of weaponized
UAVs into other nonsignatory states. There are only a handful of other regulations
that the United States follows in terms of international drone export controls. The
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) allows the United States to have
strict controls on the export of military drones, requiring authorization from the
Department of State for any U.S. citizen wishing to export weapons or defense
Commercial Drone Operations, JONES DAY 6 (July 2016), http://www.jonesday.
com/files/Publication/954642fe-a95b-4d89-ae6d-
96fee9ff8e32/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ec33fc0d-f859-4598-a55f-
a5 16fdc405f6/Key%20Issues%20and%20Insights%20for%20Transportation.pdf.
20. The FAA has also introduced waivers to § 107, allowing certain emergency UAV
operations at nighttime such as search and rescue or firefighting. See generally John D.
Goetz et al., Key Issues and Insights for Transportation and Energy Companies Regarding
Commercial Drone Operations, JONES DAY 6 (July 2016), http://www.jonesday.com/files
/Publication/954642fe-a95b-4d89-ae6d-
96fee9ff8e32/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ec33fc0d-f859-4598-a55f-
a5 16fdc405f6/Key%20Issues%20and%20Insights%20for%20Transportation.pdf.
21. Up until 2015, the U.S. had historically sold armed UAVs only to England. Missy
Ryan, Obama Administration to Allow Sales of Armed Drones to Allies, THE WASH.
POST (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cracks-
open-door-to-the-export-of-armed-drones-to-allied-nations/20 15/02/17/c5595988-b6b2-
1 1e4-9423-f3d0a lec335c-story.html?utmjterm=.ad35c583176a.
22. The MTCR carries a "strong presumption of denial" for export of Category I UAVs
that are "capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km."
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), MISSILE TECH. CONTROL REGIME, http://mter.info/
frequently-asked-questions-faqs/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
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services to a foreign buyer. The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) regulate
commercial dual use UASs that are not governed by ITAR, requiring certain
licenses before dual use UAVs can be sent to specified locations. Further
regulations on American exports of dual-use UAVs are covered under the
Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral export control regime.2 3
As one of the founding members of the MTCR and a key player in the UAV
industry, the U.S.'s aversion to the proliferation of armed drones has evolved into a
longstanding and relatively stable self-regulation of military drone exports. Even
when using drones to aid legitimate conflicts overseas, the United States prefers to
fly its own missions alone, and hold sole accountability and responsibility for
operation of the UAV. 24 When it comes to sales of weaponized UAVs, the United
States has only sold drones to the United Kingdom and France,25 but in February
2015, the Obama administration loosened the historically strict policies to allow for
international exports of certain U.S. military and commercial UAVs. Despite being
a massive policy shift, the new policy still takes cues from previous regulations,
specifically maintaining "the United States' long-standing commitments under the
MITCR." 26 The international sale of a military UAV through a direct sale between a
U.S. contractor and foreign government is still prohibited. Instead, the new policy
promotes the government-to-government security assistance as per the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA) by using the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.
Approved foreign end users will have to provide certain assurances and agree to
end-use monitoring by the U.S. government, allowing the United States greater
control over our UAV exports even after they have left the country.
This is a boost for American drone production and export, as the United States
is finally able to enter the international market without the heavy restrictions seen a
few years before. 27 The previously mentioned time delays and increasing costs of
23. KIMBERLY HSU ET AL., U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM'N, CHINA'S
MILITARY UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE INDUSTRY 15 (2013).
24. The Nigerian government has enlisted the aid of U.S. drones to track down Boko
Haram bases. However, these drones and the missions are all carried out by American
personnel, The U.S. embassy then gives sensitive information to the Nigerian army, which
is then handed over to the government for evaluation. A similar relationship exists in both
Pakistan and Jordan. See Frank Sieren, Sieren's China: The Fight for the Unmanned
Drone Market, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 22, 2015), http://p.dw.com/p/1Ga9n.
25. The sale of armed drones to England was conducted in June 2007, and to France in
August 2013. See Micah Zenko, The Great Drone Contradiction, FOREIGN POL'Y (Feb. 19,
2015, 9:11 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/19/the-great-drone-contradiction-unman
ned-aircraft-systems/?wp login redirect=0.
26. Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Export Policy for Military Unmanned Aerial
Systems, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. (Feb. 17, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2015/02/237541.htm.
27. Not long after the announcement, the U.S. began approving military drone sales to
the Netherlands ($339 million sale of MQ-9 Reapers), Japan (3 Global Hawks at $1.2
billion), and Spain ($243 million deal MQ-9 Reaper Block 5s). See Caitlin Lenzner-White,
Missing Out on the Drone Market, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 11, 2016, 9:00 AM),
736
RIVALS IN ARMS
production and development of American UAVs have resulted in extremely high-
cost systems, reducing the economic presence of American drones in the
international market. As such, the United States is entering an international drone
market rapidly being cornered by China, which has found itself "in the unique
position of having a thriving UAV industry with only a few export restrictions." 28
C. Three-fold Industry
Although the emerging Chinese UAV sector has always been a few years
behind its U.S. counterpart, it has also seen a sudden surge in field-wide
development, production, export, and regulations within the past few years. Unlike
the U.S. industry, which is primarily based around private industry and the military,
the Chinese UAV industry enjoys the benefits of a strong, well-established bond29
between foreign private industry, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), academia, and
the government (specifically, the People's Liberation Army30 ). Technological
research and production for UAVs are largely state-funded in China, reflecting
Beijing's attempts to rival and even outpace the level of research, production, and
export of the American UAV industry.31 This includes both the development and
production of military UAVs, as well as that of private, commercial UAVs for aid
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-11/the-us-should-relax-its-export-policy-
on-drones-to-compete-with-china.
28. Krasner, supra note 6, at 25.
29. Id. at 16.
30. See MICHAEL S. CHASE ET AL., EMERGING TRENDS IN CHINAS DEVELOPMENT OF
UNMANNED SYSTEMS (2015) ("China's focus on unmanned systems is at least partially
attributable to their potential utility in maritime territorial disputes, but unmanned
systems could also be useful to China's military in a range of other contingencies,
including domestic disaster relief operations.").
31. China as increased UAV research in the recent years faster than any other
country, and now every major manufacturer for the Chinese military has a research
center devoted to unmanned systems. The presence of Chinese drone companies in
international deals, such as the one between Lufthansa and DJI in early 2016, serves to
show the heightened pace of China's commercial UAV sector as well. See DEFENSE SCI.
BD., DEP'T OF DEFENSE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS
69 (2012), https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf; China Drone Manufacturers
and Industry Taken Off in Space 2016, CHINA CHAMBER OF COM. IN THE NETH.
(Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.decchina.org/2016/03/china-drone-manufacturers-and-
industry-taken-off-in-space-2016/.
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in domestic disaster relief operations,32 monitoring the environment,33 and
advancing imaging systems and communications technology.34
There are several glaring drawbacks to the copious government funding, the
least of which include "serious problems of research creativity . . . weak
accountability for research expenditures, troubled institutional arrangements . . .
and a serious undersupply of highly qualified scientists and engineers." 35 Other oft-
cited issues include "'administrative interference with academic research,' a 'lack
of fairness' in the selection of projects, gaps between promises and achievements,
and numerous instances of fraud and deception."36 The detrimental effects of these
issues are largely ameliorated, however, by the support of private enterprises,
specifically Western nations hedging their bets behind China's UAV industry. As
these foreign entities37 continue to embed themselves within China's innovation
system, they serve as pools of innovation and investment potential that lend a hand
to the sudden, but immense, growth of the UAV industry in China.38 China has also
actively engaged in gathering foreign technology to promote its UAV innovation.
While this commonly involved reverse engineering technology, China in the recent
years has turned to studying open source material and debriefing visiting U.S.
drone experts attending UAV conferences and meetings in China.39 This in turn
attracts even more foreign private interests into funding China's burgeoning UAV
industry. However, the Chinese UAV industry does not stand on the aid of foreign
private investment alone.
The PLA's funding into the civilian industry plays another pivotal role in the
surge of China's UAV R&D and production in the past few years. In 2011, China's
defense white paper noted, "civilian enterprises now account for two-thirds of
licensed entities researching and producing weapons and other defense goods." 0
32. Beijing approved the use of drones built by the Chinese Academy of Sciences
Institute of Remote Sensing Applications to image earthquake-stricken areas in Lushan in
2013. See CHASE ET AL., supra note 30, at 6.
33. The Ministry of Environmental Protection has been using drones to monitor
industrial polluters in Beijing, Shanxi, and Hebei. See id.
34. At least 15 teams are set up at major universities and research institutes to
conduct research on unmanned systems with a dramatic surge in government funding,
coming mainly from the PLA. Key research areas reportedly include development of
imaging systems and communications technology. See id. at 3.
35. Springut et al, supra note 4, at 10.
36. Id. at 33.
37. As Springut reports, this includes foreign corporations, universities, and scientists
seeking mutually beneficial partnerships with Chinese entities. Id. at 12.
38. See infra Part II for more on Western investment. See also Douglas MacMillan &
Jack Nicas, After Fresh Investment, Chinese Drone Maker DJI Valued at About $8 Billion,
WALL STREET J. (May 6, 2015, 11:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-drone-
maker-dji-raises-75-million-from-accel-partners- 1430915407.
39. Edward Wong, Hacking U.S. Secrets, China Pushes for Drones, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/world/asia/hacking-us-secrets-china-pushes
-for-drones.html? r=1&.
40. See Houpt, supra note 5, at 4, 7.
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This was due in part to China's ongoing effort to promote civil-military integration
(CMI) in its development of UAV technology. 1 As such, an increasing number of
SOEs and PLA-funded private enterprises are producing UAVs that, "while
ostensibly for civilian purposes, have clear military applications."4 2 Unlike
Lockheed Martin and the other private companies in the American drone market,
many Chinese companies involved in the UAV industry are either partially or
entirely state-owned, allowing the government to use the industrial base to exploit
domestic manufacturing and utilize the public-private partnership.4 3
Because many of these civilian-purposed UAVs have clear alternate military
potential, 4 overall production of UAVs in China is at an all-time high and only
seems to keep growing. The academia's involvement in the R&D and production of
the UAV industry is the last piece of China's UAV industry. Unlike the U.S.
military-industrial-based UAV industry, China relies on its primarily government-
funded academia "for insight into potential technological and operational
capabilities of UAVs." 5 This continues the trend of promoting CMI, widening the
research and production base of UAVs. The Chinese government funds UAV
research through two major academic groups, Project 863 and the National Natural
Science Foundation of China (NSFC). These groups then go on to fund programs,
studies, and reports throughout Chinese universities. The Nanjing University of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (NUAA), for example, houses the Unmanned
Aircraft Vehicle Research Institute and College of Automation Engineering and
receives over 10 million yuan each year from Project 863, NNSF, and Project
973-a related science fund.4 6 With such dedicated state-funding, the academia is
dictated a key role in the research portion of the UAV industry. In connection with
the civilian-military industry, 7 the academia has worked to boost the production
and export of Chinese-made UAVs to unprecedented heights.
As more and more UAV developments and innovations arise from this CMI,
China aims to further its production levels by turning to international exports of
both weaponized and commercial UAVs. The China National Aero-Technology
41. Krasner, supra note 6, at 15.
42. Houpt, supra note 5, at 7.
43. Id. at 8.
44. The CASL SL-200 is a high-altitude UAV marketed for agricultural uses, but has
"a stealthy design capable of carrying out a very diverse payload,' giving some pause
about its intended use. Additionally, one of China's largest UAV companies, ASN
Technology Group, has created the ASN-211, a lightweight drone used for weather
detection and search and rescue missions. Based off these designs ASN has also developed
a military Reconnaissance and Precise Attach UAV that can "find and destroy time-
sensitive targets immediately." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 6.
47. The Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), an SOE, hosted the
International UAV Innovation Grand Prix in September 2011, drawing entrants from a
number of Chinese universities. Participants were to design and create UAVs that could
automatically take off, cruise, and land on the deck of a simulated aircraft carrier. Id. at 7.
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Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) has featured UAVs at overseas exhibits in
the UAE, Singapore, and France, while other companies have looked into
international export options through domestic exhibits. China's expansive UAV
industry has also allowed it to create and sell weaponized UAVs at unparalleled
low costs. Although this has created an economic boon for China, the international
export of weaponized Chinese UAVs has led some to have misgivings about who
receives these UAVs."8 Realizing its leading position as one of the main
international producers and exporters of weaponized and commercial UAVs, China
has implemented several commendable operations policies and export controls to
reflect its new status.
D. Old Dog, New Tricks
Although China seems to be overall less strict on its regulation of the UAV
industry, they continue to retain several FAA-esque policies intended to ensure the
public safety in today's drone-filled society. The Provisions for the Operation of
Light and Small Unmanned Aircraft (for Trial Implementation) were issued by the
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) on December 29, 2015, and aimed
to define "what qualifies lawful operation, with the aim of normalizing the
authorized flying of UAS and preventing the unauthorized flying of UAS." 49
Unlike Part 107, which regulates commercial uses of drones under fifty-five
pounds, the CAAC provisions classify UAVs into seven categories, the first four of
which are based on weight (running from under 1.5 kg to 150 kg) and the other
three on their operational usage.5 1 In allowing operations of UAVs weighing up to
300 pounds (albeit with certain restrictions), the CAAC regulations have opened up
countless innovative possibilities from UAV producers and operators in terms of
flight capabilities, technologies, and operations. The restrictions on several
categories of UAVs also introduce useful geo-fencing and operational updates,
48. Because China tends to be extremely secretive and protective of its clients, there
have been concerns as to the potential for misuse and abusive use of these armed drones.
See Adam Rawnsley, Meet China's Killer Drones, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 14, 2016, 4:56 PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/14/meet-chinas-killer-drones/.
49. Jun Wei et al., China Launches First Operational Rules for Civil Unmanned
Aircraft, HOGAN LOVELLS: GLOBAL MEDIA & COMM. WATCH (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.hlmediacomms.com/2016/01/21/china-launches-first-operational-rules-for-civil-
unmanned-aircraft/. See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minyong Hangkong Fa
( [Civil Aviation Law of the People's Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 30, 1995, effective March
1, 1996), NAT'L PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA LEGIS. AFF. COMMISSION, 1995,
http://www.caac.gov.cn/en/ZCFG/MHFL/201509/PO20150901511659239730.pdf.
50. Class V are agriculture and crop-related UAV, Class VI governs unmanned
airships, and Class VII controls Class I and II UAV operated beyond visual line of sight
outside 100m. For more information, please consult the chart for the CAAC classifications
found in Jun Wei et al., supra note 49.
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ideas that can be implemented by the FAA to ensure a more efficient method of
monitoring ongoing UAV operations.
While the FAA does not require a constant real-time supervision system to
watch over drones, the CAAC has decided to implement a "UAV Cloud"" and
"electronic fence"52 to several classes of drones. Drones under Class III, IV, VI,
and VII53 are required to have installed the electronic fence and be constantly
connected to the Cloud when flying, and when operating in densely populated
areas, operators are expected to provide reports every second. When operating in
non-densely populated areas, reports are still expected frequently at every thirty
seconds. Despite these somewhat Orwellian differences, however, the CAAC
provisions have been styled to bring about similar protection to public safety as the
FAA's Part 107 and Canadian drone regulation." As such, the provisions also
require the purchase of insurance for UAV covering liability for third parties on the
surface, mandates that a certified, capable pilot be in command, and sets aside
flight specifications for UAV operations in the visual line of sight (VLOS)."
However, the strict requirement of having constant reports allows the CAAC to
provide even more leeway in terms of drone operations, allowing for both
operations beyond the visual line of sight (BVLOS) and nighttime flight for drones
operating BVLOS.56 The degree of laxness with which the CAAC has allowed
domestic UAV operators freedom to operate has brought even more economic
advantages to the Chinese commercial drone market, which we will see in the next
section. This, in turn, allows for further innovation and advancements in China's
CMI-backed UAV industry.
On the other hand, there is a dearth of regulations governing Chinese drones
reaching the international market. The only "controlling" international agreement
on UAVs seems to be the MTCR, of which only thirty-five countries are
signatories. In 2004, China applied for membership, but was duly rejected because
of its behavior of having loose export controls, especially with regards to missiles
and armed drone sales to North Korea and Iran.17 However, China has pledged
itself as a voluntary adherent of the MTCR. With India's recent entry into the
MTCR, the foundation has been laid to provide China with some insights into
joining the MTCR, which will be discussed in the final section of the paper.
51. A "UAS Cloud" is a dynamic database management system which monitors flight
data (including location, altitude and speed) in real time and which has an alarm function
for UAV flying into the electronic fence. Id.
52. The electronic fence is a software and hardware system in which specific areas are
identified as prohibited and function to stop aircraft from entering such areas. Id.
53. Id.
54. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR. & ELIOT 0. SPRAGUE, DOMESTICATING DRONES: THE
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND ECONOMICS OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT § 7.3.4 (2017).
55. Jun Wei, et al., supra note 46.
56. Id.
57. Wade Boese, Missile Regime Puts off China, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N (Nov. 1, 2004),
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/MTCR.
741
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 25:2
In mid-2015, China attempted self-regulation of export controls, with the
Chinese State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National
Defense (SASTIND) under the MIIT, joined by the Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM), General Administration of Customs (Customs), and the army
approving a temporary export ban on certain dual-use UAVs. These three systems
include: (1) UAVs with a range of 300 km or greater; (2) UAVs with aerosol
dispensing systems with apparatuses comprising a capacity of 20 L or more; and
(3) UAVs having the operator's ability to control flight from outside the Line of
Sight.58 The export ban is still ongoing at the time of this writing. The export ban
affects very few commercial UAVs, meaning that China's production and economy
will be left largely untouched by the ramifications of this restriction. 59 With
relatively lax domestic drone operations regulations and a handful of international
drone export controls, China has been able to reap full economic advantage of the
UAV industry.
II. Too SOON To TELL? RESULTS OF CHINA'S EXPANSION
Following the end of the Mao era, China underwent a rapid age of economic
expansion and modernization, which continues today with its huge expansion into
the UAV industry. As the U.N. Council on Foreign Relations reported in March
2015, the goal of contemporary China is "the accumulation of 'comprehensive
national power,"' the pursuit of which involves all dimensions of economy,
military, technology, and diplomacy.6 0 One of the most crucial goals, however, is
to sustain high economic growth, not only to maintain governmental legitimacy,
but to maintain the international standing of modern China as well. To that end, the
UAV industry, with its more flexible regulations on Chinese soil, has a powerful
potential to act as a major agent of economic change and allow China to surpass the
United States as the leader of the international UAV industry. There are both costs
V-,&205P-7320-q-(f bI~4 ~~ [joint
Announcement [2015] No. 20 of the MOFCOM, Customs, SASTIND, and General
Armament Department of the People's Liberation Army of China on Implementing Export
Control over Dual-Use Unmanned Aircraft] (June 25, 2015), http://www.customs.gov
.cn/publish/portal0/tab515/info761305.htm [https://perma.cc/3TPS-T486]. See also Laney
Zhang, Regulation of Drones: People's Republic of China, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (Apr. 2016),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/regulation-of-drones/china.php.
59. Huifeng Hu, China Restricts Exports of "High Performance" Drones as National
Security Fears Heighten, South China Morning Post (Aug. 1, 2015, updated Jan. 23, 2018),
http://www.semp.com/tech/china-tech/article/1845754/china-restricts-exports-high-
performance-drones-national-security (according to Shao Jinhuo, vice-president of DJI
Technology, which controls 70% of the global market for civilian drones, "[t]he ban is
targeting drones not designed for commercial use, and will protect key technologies of
Chinese companies.").
60. ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & ASHLEY J. TELLIS, REVISING U.S. GRAND STRATEGY
TOWARD CHINA 8 (2015).
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and benefits to reaching the top, as we will see through China's economic gain and
potentially detrimental geopolitical consequences from this rapid expansion.
As part of China's move toward modem technological innovation, its
government has backed trillions of yuan into the drone market.61 Nevertheless,
Beijing is not the only economic player in the Chinese UAV market. As discussed
earlier, the embedding of foreign private companies into the Chinese UAV industry
has greatly accelerated industry growth and acts as another crucial piece of the
economic puzzle behind China's drones. In August 2015, Intel Corp., a U.S.
investor, backed Chinese drone manufacturer Yuneec with $60 million, followed
by an injection of $67 million in eight other Chinese drone companies that year. As
a result of both government and privately backed foreign funding into the UAV
industry, drones have reached beyond the military application of the Chinese
economy and into a multitude of other sectors, encompassing agriculture, 6 2 oil and
gas,63 and municipal governance. 64
The funding for and rapid developments in the Chinese UAV industry would
have been highly unlikely had they occurred in a developed economy such as that
of the United States. An overabundance of treaties and restrictive regulations
placing strict prohibitions on the UAV industry, as well as cripplingly slow
advancement in operations regulation has slowed the United States' presence in the
UAV industry, greatly reducing its positive economic potential. On the other hand,
the CAAC has released clear-cut but less restrictive regulations in 2016 covering
the basic requirements and operational control of UAVs to ensure public safety (not
unlike the FAA's Part 107), while also providing detailed guidelines for UAV
classifications and the usage of UAV Cloud. As such, the CAAC's regulations have
covered the public safety issue so promoted by the FAA, but have also addressed
61. "China [has] spent a total of 1.42 trillion yuan ($206.05 billion) on R&D in 2015, up
8.9 percent over the previous year." Dominique Patton, China's Spending on R&D Rises to
2.07 Percent of GDP, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-r-
d-idUSKBN13G1NG. See also Xinhua, Phones and Drones - China's Risk-Takers Who Rule
the World, CHINA DAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-01/03/content_2291
0153.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2016, 9:42 PM); Thibaud, Drones Market in China Has
Room to Soar, DAXUE CONSULTING (June 29, 2016), http://daxueconsulting.com/drones-
market-in-china-has-room-to-soar/.
62. Newley Purnell & Jack Nicas, Chinese Drone Maker Plows into Agriculture, WALL
STREET J. (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-drone-maker-plows-into-
agriculture- 1448573490.
63. Hugh Harsono, Drones: Putting China's Economy on Autopilot, TECHCRUNCH
(June 3, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/20 16/06/03/drones-putting-chinas-economy-on-auto
pilot/.
64. See Jason Reagan, Police Drones Unleashed in China, DRONELIFE.COM (Jan. 28,
2016), http://dronelife.com/2016/01/28/police-drones-unleashed-in-china/; Xinhua, SW
China Police Use Drones to Monitor Traffic, CHINA DAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com
.cn/china/2016-09/18/content_26818926.htm (last updated Sept. 18, 2016, 3:39 PM).
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potential R&D and production issues through a more detailed, but even more
flexible guideline.6 5
As referenced earlier, several crucial economic actors have been alienated by
the FAA's ever-tightening rules regarding commercial drone deliveries,66 which are
further hampered by the FAA's bureaucratic red-tape. In 2014, the FAA began
issuing licensed exemptions for commercial drones on a case-by-case basis, but so
far has only granted 6,100 waivers. There are still over 7,600 applications waiting
for approval, with most of these companies either being unable to take flight at all,
or risking the potential for high fines and penalties by operating commercial drones
without the FAA's permission. 67 As such, many companies are turning away from
the U.S. economy and looking for new testing locations elsewhere. Amazon, one of
the largest international online retailers, has decided to look toward China as a
primary source to develop a commercial delivery drone system. 68 Amazon's Prime
Air service, aiming to deliver packages of up to five pounds to customers in under
thirty minutes, has faced immeasurable difficulty in light of FAA regulations. 69
Although Amazon recently has expanded its drone delivery testing sites to
include the United Kingdom, 70 it continues its negotiations with Beijing to achieve
drone delivery in China's fast-paced UAV industry. This not only advances
China's technological innovation, but greatly expands China's economic output
65. For example, current FAA regulations have limited the usage of commercial drones
to only a select few industries, such as surveying in the agriculture, mining, and oil and
gas sectors. On the other hand, the CAAC's classification of UAV is mainly based on
weight (with Class V being the exception of agricultural UAV), but no other restrictions
are announced. As long as research, production, and operation of new UAV conform to the
policies per class, and are connected to the UAV Cloud, Beijing sees no reason to create so
many barriers to entry and operation to the UAV industry, unlike the FAA.
66. Under these rules, commercial drones weighing up to 55 pounds may fly only
during daylight hours, reducing Amazon and other retailers' ability to run drone deliveries
only a handful of hours a day (even less in winter months). FAA requires pilots to retain
constant VLOS and fly under 400 feet to avoid airplanes. Operations must also avoid
flying over people in public so as to preserve public safety. Pilots must pass a safety test
every 24 months and be vetted by the TSA before the FAA can clear them for these
commercial drone operations.
67. Associated Press, White House Clears Small, Commercial Drones for Takeoff ABC
10 NEWS (June 21, 2016, 7:48 AM), http://www. 10news.com/news/national/white-house-
clears-small-commercial-drones-for-takeoff.
68. See PERRITT, JR. & SPRAGUE, supra note 54 ("The relative maturity of Chinese
drone regulation has permitted Amazon and local competitors to experiment with drone
package delivery more extensively in China than elsewhere.").
69. The FAA requirement that pilots retain a constant VLOS for all instances when
operating a commercial drone creates a massive obstacle for commercial drone deliveries.
70. On July 25, 2016, Amazon announced its partnership with the British government
to test commercial drone delivery. See Ananya Bhattacharya, Up Up and Away: Amazon is
Going to Britain for Drone Testing U.S. Won't Allow, QUARTZ (July 26, 2016),
http://qz.com/742396/amazon-is-going-to-britain-for-drone-testing-the-us-wont-allow/.
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from drones as well. Due to China's more accommodating views and regulations"1
on drone deliveries and commercial operations, Amazon's Prime Air service, as
well as the proposed Google Project Wing, 2 already face competition in such a
nascent sector. Within the last two years, two e-commerce giants operating out of
China (JD.com and Alibaba) began operating commercial drones in parts of China
for delivery purposes. In 2015, Alibaba partnered with Shanghai YTO Express
Logistics Corp. to deliver tea packets to over 450 Chinese customers who
volunteered for a trial of drone delivery. Although this was a one-time program,
Chinese UAV regulations were accommodating enough to allow Alibaba to test its
drones over densely populated cities including Guangzhou, Shanghai, and
Beijing.73 This project was successfully replicated by Alibaba's largest rival in e-
commerce, JD.com. 4
Despite the presence of these companies, Amazon and Google remain heavily
invested in the prospects of expanding their drone delivery services to China. The
appeal lies in China's less stringent regulations of the UAV industry, with both the
government and private industry working in concert to promote and advance the
development of military and commercial UAVs. China stands to expect an
economic windfall from its loose regulations with regards to commercial drone
delivery operations, especially with so many domestic and foreign corporations
interested in operating in the country in the face of already well-established
domestic competitors.
Outside of benefitting from less restrictive commercial drone operations
regulations, China has also managed to corner a crucial segment of the
international UAV market-low-cost drones.15 Because it is not a member of many
of the treaties and ratifications that have attempted to limit the proliferation of dual-
use UAVs, China is easily leaping into a sparsely contested international UAV
71. "Outside the U.S., many countries have adopted simple rules allowing commercial
use of drones, then adjusted the rules based on experience." See L. Gordon Crovitz, While
Amazon Waits, Drones Fly, WALL STREET J. (June 26, 2016, 5:20 PM), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/while-amazon-waits-drones-fly- 1466976049.
72. Another commercial drone delivery operation, this time founded by Google but still
continuing in talks with China to expand testing to the Chinese market.
73. See Lulu Yilun Chen, Alibaba Drones Fly Over Beijing While Amazon Pleads for
U.S. Tests, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Feb. 4, 2015, 1:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2015-02-04/alibaba-drones-fly-over-beijing-as-amazon-pleads-for-u-s-tests.
74. In east China's Jiangsu Province, JD.com has been operating two drones, carrying
up to 33 pounds of cargo, over a distance of 12 miles, and up to 33 miles per hour,
according to JD.com's VTP. Additionally, these UAVs can fulfill up to 200 orders a day and
have dropped the delivery cost to less than a dime per order. See Felipe Araujo, Chinese
Company Beats Amazon to Deliver Online Goods by Unmanned Drone, MIRROR.CO.UK
(June 19, 2016, 3:55 PM), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/chinese-company-
beats-amazon-deliver-8230920; see also Kelsey D. Atherton, Chinese Company Begins
Offering Drone Deliveries to Rural Areas, POPULAR SCI. (June 8, 2016), http://www
.popsci.com/chines-online-retailer-start-drone-delivery-in-rural-areas.
75. See Krasner, supra note 4, at 26.
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market. 6 While the United States continues its strict adherence to the MTCR and
has only recently come to realize the economic benefits of international
weaponized drone sales, China has for the past few years already established a
strong foothold in the international drone market. The main reason for this
dominance is China's ability to beat out the United States in pricing. Although
studies have found that the Chinese UAV R&D has not yet caught up with that of
the United States," smaller, developing nations with less spending money are more
than willing to pay for an inferior product at a bargain price." In late 2015, Iraqi
forces allegedly used Chinese-made Cai Hong CH-4s to destroy ISIS positions in
Ramadi.79 In 2016, Nigeria confirmed that it purchased five Chinese-made CH-3s
to combat the militant group Boko Haram.so Other nations that have purportedly
purchased weaponized UAVs from China include Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and the United Arab Emirates.
As China continues its path to leading the UAV industry, it will most likely
have to become a member of the MTCR. This is highly valuable to China's UAV
industry, as it would be allowed to trade and transfer sensitive UAV technology
with other member MTCR nations, and sell UAV systems to any nation without
any sanctions. 81 However, these recent unregulated sales of weaponized UAVs
might jeopardize China's chances at being allowed into the MTCR, as nations feel
it continues the trend of China's sales record to rogue nations such as North Korea,
Iran, and Pakistan.8 2 In spite of this, China's recent export control policies have
shown it is willing to make the necessary changes required to be a member of the
76. See Sarah Kreps, China Swooping in on Military Drone Market, CNN (Apr. 1, 2016,
12:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/01/opinions/china-drone-sales-kreps/.
77. Out of the seven models listed by the International Institute for Strategic Studies'
Military Balance 2011 as in active PLA service, about half are outdated and limited in
capability. Two models in service, the ASN-105 and ASN-206, are based on technology
from the 1960s. The CH-1 Chang Hong was based on 1950s U.S. technology. Other UAVs
are developed in the 1960s (and thus beyond antiquated) or purchased from old Israeli
technology. See Houpt, supra note 5.
78. For example, the Wing Loong drones made by AVIC cost $1 million, compared to its
counterpart with similar technology, the $30 million U.S. Reaper. See Sieren, supra note
24.
79. See Patrick Boehler & Gerry Doyle, Use by Iraqi Military May be a Boon for China-
Made Drones, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/business/
international/china-drone-export-iraq.html?_r= 1.
80. See Kelsey D. Atherton, Watch Nigeria's First Confirmed Drone Strike -- Against
Boko Haram, POPULAR SCI. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.popsci.com/watch-nigerias-first-
confirmed-drone -strike.
81. See Vivek Raghuvanshi, New Diplomatic Status Fuels Indian Appetite for Arms
Trade, DEF. NEWS (June 16, 2016), http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/
06/16/new-diplomatic-status-fuels-indian-appetite-arms/85979808/.
82. See Prakash Katoch, China's Great Betrayal: Why did India's Eastern Neighbour
Block the NSG Bid?, FIRSTPOST.COM (June 24, 2016, 3:10 PM), http://www.firstpost.
com/world/chinas-great-betrayal-why-did-indias-eastern-neighbour-block-the-nsg-bid-
2853800.html.
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MTCR. With the realization that it has become a primary exporter of UAVs to the
international market, China has taken some steps toward limiting the rampant
proliferation of drones, specifically weaponized UAVs. As discussed above, the
2015 export ban was a first step toward China attempting to limit the proliferation
of its armed UAV exports, realizing its critical role as a leader in the international
drone revolution. This opens the door for a multitude of collaborative opportunities
between the United States and China, as the current leaders of the UAV industry, to
boost their economies through the UAV industry.
III. TOWARD A BRIGHTER FUTURE
As the two leading entities in UAV development, production, export, and
regulation, China and the United States are in the best positions to spearhead the
creation of an efficient international framework for exports of weaponized drones
and an effective synthesis of both FAA and CAAC regulations to promote
economic innovation in the commercial drone sector. The FAA and CAAC have
had a long-standing history of joint bilateral work and cooperation going as far
back as the early 1980s.83 Today, both agencies have already issued relatively
similar regulations governing UAVs, setting up "a risk-based approach framework
that regulates UAS in a manner proportionate to the risk presented by the UAS
operation."" The FAA's regulations have already received harsh criticism a few
months into their implementation, since they are found to be extremely restrictive
on commercial drone operations. Exemptions are generally approved, but are
backlogged in a line over 7,000 applicants long. As these regulations are constantly
evolving and subject to change,15 it could stand to draw some changes and ideas
from the CAAC regulations. Certainly, the United States would have to adopt a
similar mindset as the Chinese government toward commercial operations of
drones. The FAA constantly stresses the importance of public safety in issuing
regulations on UAVs, placing similar emphasis on operations over densely
populated urban areas as it does on operations in rural, non-densely populated
areas. However, this severely restricts drone flights to only daylight operations
within the VLOS, which have hampered the efforts of companies implementing
drones in their deliveries. Instead, the FAA should loosen standards to allow less-
restrictive flights over rural, non-densely populated areas, similar to the CAAC
83. The most prominent of which were the establishment of the US-China Civil
Aviation Agreement and the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement in 1984. See THERESA L.
KRAUS, CELEBRATING A HISTORY OF EXCELLENCE: FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION/CIVIL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA EXECUTIVE LEVEL
COOPERATION AND THE AGREEMENT PROCESS 2 (2010), https://www.faa.gov/about
/history/media/celebrating-faa-caac.pdf.
84. See What Can the FAA Learn from China?, DRONE360 MAG. at 14 (March/April
2016) (quoting Lisa Ellman, partner of Hogan Lovells and co-chair of their UAS Group).
85. See 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2016).
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only requiring thirty-second updates instead of the constant updates every second
for operations over densely populated urban areas.
The FAA and the U.S. government should also take note of China's UAV
Cloud and electric fence system, which links all connected and registered UAVs
into a cloud monitored by the government. While this may seem to be
governmental overreach, China's electronic surveillance system only requires
certain UAV classifications to be connected to the network when they are operating
in key governmental areas or in airport clear zones. Heavier commercial drones and
unmanned airships are required to be constantly connected and registered to the
electronic network,86 an understandable precaution required to protect the public
safety and prevent any accidents." Not only is this system more reliable than geo-
mapping capabilities on individual drones, but it is also an efficient failsafe,
allowing the government to shut down any connected UAV that poses a threat or
whose pilot has lost control of the system. The constant updates to China's cloud
system by connected UAVs also, while restrictive, is a terrific consideration for
expanding to cover UAV regulations in the United States. This instills
accountability and responsibility to each pilot, since his actions are constantly
tracked and accounted for by the cloud network. Additionally, the FAA could, by
receiving constant updates regarding the tendencies of UAV pilots or patterns of
UAV operations, adapt its regulations to meet fluctuating demands of a constantly
evolving new sector.
Turning to the international export controls, the United States and China are
well suited to work together toward a standardized international framework for
weaponized UAV exports. The United States stands in a dominant position to
convince China to help formulate such an agreement. Given that the United States
is the most prolific user of armed drones in the world," and with the investment of
numerous Western corporations into China's burgeoning UAV industry, the United
States has enough clout within the UAV industry and China to bring this issue to
the table. China had already attempted to join the MTCR in 2004 and, despite being
rejected, remains a selective adherent. With its most recent export ban on dual use
86. See Jun Wei et al., supra note 49.
87. At time of publication, the CAAC has introduced a "real-name registration"
regulation, requiring all civil UAV manufacturers and owners to apply for an account in
the CAAC UAV Real-name Registration System starting June 1, 2017. CAAC, Regulations
on Real-name Registration of Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Formally Issued by CAAC,
CIVIL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA (May 24, 2017), http://www.caac.gov.cn
/en/XWZX/201705/t20170524_44222.html. This was allegedly due to drone disruption of
over 240 airline flights near the Chongqing Jiangbei International Airport in April of
2017. Li Tao, DJI Sales Hit by Tighter Chinese Government Regulations on Drone Flight
Safety, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 24, 2017, 9:19 PM), http://www.semp.com/
business/companies/article/2095562/dji-sales-hit-tighter-chinese-government-regulations-
drone-flight.
88. See MICAH ZENKO & SARAH KREPS, LIMITING ARMED DRONE PROLIFERATION 6
(2014).
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UAVs, China has shown itself to be a potentially willing participant in some form
of regulatory framework limiting the exports of weaponized unmanned systems.
India's recent entry into the MTCR is a double-edged sword, providing
insights toward, while acting as an obstacle against, China's potential future within
the MTCR's framework. As a new signatory, India is expected to place voluntary
restrictions on its own exports and end-use agreements on trades of armed UAVs.
In return, India will most likely see an increase in trades with other MTCR
members through transfers of sensitive technology, including armed UAVs.
Additionally, it will enhance the joint ventures between India and other nations"
and allow India to sell and transfer its UAVs and missile systems to non-MTCR
countries without attracting sanctions. Given its position as one of the world
leaders in the UAV industry, China stands to gain quite a bit from its entry into the
MTCR. The ability to freely transfer sensitive UAV technology between MTCR
members will certainly boost China's own UAV research, and serve to build a
more solid Sino-U.S. relationship. On the other hand, India now has veto power
over entry of aspiring states, and has "a leverage against China, which can be
wielded in the same way as China has used its membership in NSG to prevent
India's entry."" However, given the economic benefits of membership and
realization of its leading role in the UAV industry, China will most likely cooperate
with the requirements for MTCR members to be part of this agreement. If it does,
China will be able to collaborate with the other members and, more importantly,
with the United States to affect more encompassing and efficient changes to the
MTCR.
Recognizing the limitations of the MTCR, several studies have attempted to
suggest a different framework by which an international regulation of UAVs can
attain worldwide acceptance.91 One of the most convincing arguments is found in
the UNCFR Report No. 69, where the authors find that "the domestic politics of
treaty ratification and the international politics of removing drones from the MTCR
and creating a new treaty would only create more barriers to an international
agreement on the governance of [UAVs]."92 What is important is that the MTCR
undergo a process of clarification, where countries interested in creating an
international governance on UAV exports would have to establish "an accepted
89. With its entry into the MTCR, India is set to discuss a joint venture with Russia to
develop the Brahmos cruise missile system to sell to third countries. See Ankita
Rajeshwari, What is MTCR and How can India Benefit From It?, TIMES OF INDIA (June
7, 2016), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/What-is-MTCR-and-how-can-India-benefit-
from-it/listshow/52640322.cms.
90. See Raghuvanshi, supra note 81.
91. See, e.g., id.; JOHN P. ABIZAID & ROSA BROOKS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON U.S. DRONE POLICY 47-48 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing additional factors
to add to the MTCR, such as establishment of special factors to overcome "presumption of
denial," and recommending the U.S. government to re-evaluate and identify the two
categories covered by the MTCR.).
92. ZENKO & KREPS, supra note 88, at 23.
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understanding of how specific legal terms are interpreted and applied . . . [and a]
more faithful and transparent adherence to them."93 This includes a restructuring of
the "strong presumption of denial" clause, which merely suggests that members
should strongly presume denying the export of Category I UAVs. Unfortunately the
United States, even as the co-founder of the agreement, has managed to find
exemptions to this clause, exporting Category I UAVs to close allies, arguing that
proliferation norms will erode once countries have the capabilities to produce
Category I items domestically and start exporting them.94 With China as a member
of the MTCR, a Sino-U.S. cooperation could start promoting a more stringent
standard of proliferation of Category I systems, beginning with reflection and
potential synthesis of the United States' and China's most recent attempts at self-
regulation of weaponized UAVs.
Additionally, the MTCR would have to be altered to address the modem
advancements in UAV technologies. The definitions laid out by the MTCR,
specifically that of Category I systems, are based on arbitrary payloads and
thresholds and only show how any advances in the UAV industry could export a
Category I armed drone in the future (by making it lighter or fall just short of
threshold requirements). Instead, there should be a shift toward "an agreement
organized around . . . mission type-lethal versus nonlethal" that would be more
relevant with the rise of technology.95 Considering several nations' (including
China) objections to the export of armed drones,96 it seems many are open to
dialogue for an international agreement governing exports of armed UAVs.
One available course of action would be to hold formal Sino-U.S. discussions
to increase the transparency and predictability as to U.S. and Chinese drone exports
through the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Process. This process has
strong potential to place both leading nations of the UAV industry in the same
room to begin talk processes regarding bringing China into the fold of the MTCR
and updating the MTCR to reflect the modem UAV realities. With ever-increasing
numbers of U.S. companies investing into the Chinese drone market,97 and with the
Chinese market containing five of the top eleven venture capital-funded drone
93. Id.
94. Id. at 18.
95. Id.
96. China had pointed to armed drones in the international arena as '[a] 'blank space
in international law' that is 'subject to abuse."' Id. at 20.
97. As discussed above, Intel Corp.'s backing of Yuneec and eight other Chinese drone
companies. In March of 2016, Qualcomm Inc. set up a $2.8 million joint venture with
China's Thunder Software to develop drone software. See Eva Dou, Qualcomm Will Make
China-Customized Chips Through Chinese Venture, WALL STREET J. (May 27, 2016,
8:13 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/qualcomm-will-make-china-customized-chips-thro
ugh-chinese-venture- 1464351198.
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companies globally,98 it would be in the interests of both nations to come together
to regulate the international UAV market and reap its full economic advantages.
The only setback to U.S.-Chinese cooperation would be each nation's
individual domestic politics, especially the U.S. Congress. Amongst senior U.S.
government officials, there is a staunch, unresolved divide over the U.S. exports of
UAVs, especially those with dual-use military capabilities. On one hand, there are
officials who believe that leasing or selling dual-use, or even armed, UAVs to
friendly nations would foster better partnership capacity amongst U.S. allies and
partners.99 On the other hand are officials that believe that any alteration of the
MTCR to loosen international export controls on UAVs would "erode the norm
created by other MTCR member states, as well as non-members."oo
The impression of China's view of the UAV industry and fostering
international cooperation with regards to export and proliferation seems to be quite
positive. Unfortunately, there has been little conversation coming from China's end
about promoting a joint U.S. -China endeavor to alter the MTCR and bring about
international governance for UAV exports. Perhaps this was because of the 2004
MTCR membership snub, or perhaps Beijing may be simply focused on addressing
domestic regulations and taking advantage of the international drone market before
limiting China by entering into international export agreements. In any case,
China's 2015 export ban on dual use UAVs, and its voluntary adherence to the
MTCR (ironic, in light of its recent sales of armed drones to other nations), are
pointed in the right direction, and hopefully a sign of more to come. Only then will
we be taking the proper steps toward ensuring more efficient UAV operational
standards and advancing toward better standardized regulations for international
production and export of UAVs.
Despite these obstacles, the regulatory efforts of the CAAC and FAA have
established a foundational blueprint that acts as a jumping-off point for several
other national UAV regulations. In the developing ACP countries, the UAV market
has rapidly expanded into the natural resource management sector, such as the
management of crops, livestock, fisheries, and forests.101 As such, these nations
have developed similar regulations to that of the CAAC and FAA, placing
limitations and restrictions on aircraft registration, no-fly zones, operator
certification, and aircraft restrictions by weight category. Although not a staggering
98. Kay Wackwitz, These are the Top20 VC-Funded Drone Companies to Have on Your
Radar in 2016, DRONE INDUS. INSIGHTS (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.droneii
.com/top20-vc-funded-drone-companies-2016.
99. Furthermore, these officials believe that this would also allow the U.S. to "promote
[the UASs] responsible use with monitoring and end-user verification agreements." ZENKO
& KREPS, supra note 88, at 18.
100. Id. at 19.
101. Drone Governance: A Scan of Policies, Laws and Regulations Governing the Use of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in 79 ACP Countries 1 (Tech. Ctr. for Agric. & Rural
Cooperation, Working Paper 16/12, 2016), https://publications.cta.int/media/publications/
downloads/1971_PDF.pdf.
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number by any means, 19 percent of the ACP countries (fifteen of the seventy -nine
member nations) have already established rules specific to UAV operations, and six
other ACP countries have announced soon-to-be-drafted UAV legislation.1 0 2 A
main driving force for UAV regulation in the ACP countries has been the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an extension of the United
Nations. The ICAO has published guidance manuals 10 3 assisting regulators in
addressing issues arising from UAV expansion and has called on states to defer to
their guidance on establishing UAV regulations, many of which parallel the CAAC
and FAA regulations.10 4
In Japan, the increasing use of UAVs for rescue operations, natural disaster
relief, and commercial purposes has led the government to adopt similar UAV
regulations as those promulgated by the CAAC. Like China, Japan is attempting to
introduce BVLOS flights, a policy that the FAA regulations have lagged on. This
would allow pilots to operate drones beyond their own visual line of sight, opening
up the potential for boundless commercial and natural disaster relief applications
for UAVs. As such, many companies are flocking to Japan, as well as China, to test
these new commercial drone applications.10 While China has allowed a few small
commercial UAV trials in densely populated areas, Japan has formed special de-
regulation zones to test the feasibility of commercial drones. In one of such zones,
Chiba (a city about twenty-four miles east of Tokyo), the Japanese government has
loosened regulations on maximum flight altitude and line of sight requirements to
accommodate commercial drone delivery trials. Working closely with research
institutes, private companies, and city officials, the Japanese government has
actively encouraged1 0 6 the drone delivery of prescription medicines and daily
necessities in Chiba and has shown that it is entirely possible to continue
developing UAV regulations while promoting innovative UAV applications and
usage.
The European Union has faced a fragmented regulatory framework when it
came to UAV regulations. Given the nature of the European Union itself, a large
102. Of the ACP countries with existing UAV regulations, seven of the Caribbean
countries established their UAV policies without updating their Civil Aviation Regulations
(CARs), showing that drone regulation can be put in place rapidly. Id. at 9.
103. See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Cir 328
AN/190 (2011), https://www.icao.int/meetings/uas/documents/circular%20328_en.pdf.
104. See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
(RPAS), Doc. 10019 AN/507 (1st ed. 2015), http://servicos.decea.gov.br/arquivos/drone/Doc
10019 Manual onRPASEnglish_.pdf.
105. See Miriam McNabb, Japan Adjusts Drone Regulations to Support Industry,
DRONELIFE.COM (Jan. 4, 2016), http://dronelife.com/2016/01/04/Jiapan-adjusts-drone-
regulations-to-support-industry/.
106. See Miriam McNabb, Japan Designates "Deregulation Zones" to Test Drones,
DRONELIFE.COM (Dec. 16, 2015), http://dronelife.com/2015/12/16/j apan-designates-
deregulation-zones-to-test-drones/. See also Chiba Drone Alliance Pushes for Delivery
Service by 2019, THE JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016
/10/07/business/chiba-drone-alliance-pushes-delivery-service-2019/#.WIYaWLYrKnc.
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majority of the UAV legislation differed from member state to member state, with
each nation experimenting and developing its own specific sets of regulations.
Recognizing the need to match the rapid pace of UAV development with a
standardization of industry standards and activities,107 the European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) issued a basic regulatory guidance manual to address a key
number of UAV operational safeguards in a coherent manner. 10 s In August 2016,
the EASA published "The Prototype," which sets outs a regulatory framework for
UAVs that is operation centric, proportionate, and risk-and-performance-based, not
unlike those established by the FAA and CAAC. 109 The "Prototype" also provides
general limitations on hobby drones, operator certification, VLOS, and no-fly
zones.110 As a relatively new body of legislation, only time will tell if the EASA's
"Prototype" is successful at UAV regulation. Given the relative success of the
CAAC and FAA policies, it is not implausible for the new EASA regulations to
bring tremendous positive impact in the European drone industry.
CONCLUSION
The future of the UAV industry has just begun, and is slated to see a dramatic
surge over the next few decades. As technology develops, more and more nations
will acquire UAVs at a lower price, resulting in rampant international UAV
proliferation. As leaders in the industry, China and the United States are the best
candidates to reach out to the international community to establish an efficient,
synthesized commercial drone operations regulatory policy, and restructure the
international regime regarding armed UAV exports. Despite both nations being in
the forefront of the modem UAV industry, they are not without their own faults
and drawbacks.
The "drone revolution" took hold in the United States in the early 1970s,
mainly as part of military initiatives. However, in the last few years, the production
and operation of civilian and commercial UAVs have become extremely prevalent
thanks to the military-industrial complex branching out into the commercial
civilian UAV sector. As a response to this massive surge, the FAA has been by far
the most effective regulatory body governing the domestic operation of UAVs,
attempting to create a series of flexible regulations that can adapt to the ever-
changing future of the UAV industry. However, the FAA regulations have been
107. See EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY, 'PROTOTYPE' COMMISSION REGULATION
ON UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS 4 (2016) (explanatory note to prototype regulation),
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Explanatory%20Note%20for%20the%20UAS
%20Prototype%20regulation%20final.pdf.
108. Civil Drones (Unmanned Aircraft), EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY,
https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/civil-drones-rpas (last visited Dec. 12, 2017).
109. See EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY, 'PROTOTYPE' COMMISSION REGULATION
ON UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS (2016) (prototype regulation), https://www.
easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/UAS%20Prototype%20Regulation%20final.pdf.
110. Id.
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created at a glacial pace, raising questions of whether or not they will be effective
in keeping up with the pace of UAV modernization. Additionally, FAA regulations
place stringent restrictions on operations of commercial UAVs, leading to vocal
backlash and potentially undermining the economic benefits the United States had
to gain from the UAV industry.
China has also undergone a similar "drone revolution," seeing massive spikes
in its UAV R&D, production, export, and regulations. These operational
regulations, which retain certain similarities to FAA policies, are a lot more flexible
and accommodating to commercial drone operations than Part 107. Coupled with
the Chinese government's open and direct involvement in the UAV industry, and
the complex, interwoven nature of foreign private industry, SOEs, academia, and
the PLA, China stands to undergo a massive UAV modernization and see huge
economic returns in the coming years. However, the state-funded nature of a
majority of China's UAV industry comes at a cost, resulting in complaints of
biased selection and corruption.III Despite these setbacks, China's UAV industry is
continually expanding, threatening to outpace the United States in the coming few
years.
China is slowly but surely beginning to understand the importance of its role in
setting the future agenda of the UAV industry, both domestically and
internationally. Like the United States, China carries the responsibility of ensuring
that its UAV production, export controls, and operational regulations are well-
classified and are easily clarified. As such, China should consider re-application to
the MTCR, and signatory members should heavily consider allowing China into
the agreement. This will allow China and the United States, two leading nations in
the UAV industry, to take charge of making the necessary alterations to the MTCR
so as to ensure the bright future of the rapidly rising UAV market. In the realm of
domestic commercial drone regulations, both the CAAC and FAA are the leading
established authorities, having created regulatory frameworks upon which other
nations legislate their commercial UAV regulations. With more and more nations
adopting similar measures, it will not be long before the leading aviation authorities
initiate a concerted effort to form an international framework to regulate
commercial UAVs.
111. Similarly, with regards to operations of UAVs, civilians have noted that "penalties
for violations of the law in China typically are more severe than in other states, although
enforcement is uneven and often politically motivated." PERRITT, JR. & SPRAGUE, supra
note 54.
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